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ABSTRACT
This essay explores virtue ethical concepts in the context of animal
law theory and practice. For reasons discussed in the essay, virtue
ethics may not, on its own, serve as an adequate foundation for general anticruelty statutes, but it may have application in those contexts
in which sufficient sharing of values enables participants in legal reform to work through differences in moral commitments to generate
at least temporarily acceptable laws. The article considers a detailed
example of that type of application, based on the actual and realistic
situation of legislator-requested feral cat colony caretakers’ participation in the development of ordinances that regulate the management
of such colonies.
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Scholarship at the intersection of animal law and moral
philosophy is varied, interesting in its own right, and important when contemplating productive approaches to law reform. Gary L. Francione has developed a coherent, compelling
animal rights theory based on analysis of the legal status of
other-than-human animals, current treatment of those animals,
and careful consideration of Kantian moral philosophy (Francione 1995, 2008). David Favre has written several articles to
propose animal law reform founded on a utilitarian approach
(Favre 2000, 2005, 2010). In comparison to deontological and
utilitarian theories, the application of virtue ethics to animal
law is still new. And, while the most satisfying theory and basis
for reform may ultimately combine deontological and virtue
ethical theory, it is worth exploring some aspects of virtue ethics in the animal law context.
There are many philosophers focused on virtue ethics, but,
for purposes of this essay, I rely heavily on the work of Rosalind Hursthouse. In her book On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse begins with a simple contrast between utilitarian, deontological,
and virtue ethical approaches:
Imagine a case in which it is obvious that I should, say,
help someone in need. A utilitarian will emphasize the
fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize
well-being, a deontologist will emphasize the fact that,
in doing so, I will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “do unto others as you would be done
by,” and a virtue ethicist will emphasize the fact that
helping the person would be charitable or benevolent
(Hursthouse 1999, 1).
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Hursthouse contends that, although normative ethics has been
dominated recently by deontological and utilitarian theories,
virtue ethics can be an equally useful source of normative guidance on its own as well as in combination with deontological
and utilitarian theories.
Hursthouse notes that the starting point for deontological or
utilitarian analysis has been to determine the moral status of the
being/entity about which there is a question of appropriate conduct. She questions whether such a starting point is useful or
necessary for all normative theories, including virtue ethics. In
her essay, “Virtue Theory and Abortion,” Hursthouse explores
whether it is necessary from a virtue ethical perspective to determine the moral status of a fetus before deciding what moral
conduct is in regards to a fetus (Hursthouse 1997, 217-38).
Similarly, in her article “Applying Virtue Ethics to Our Treatment of the Other Animals,” Hursthouse begins with the question of whether it is necessary to determine the moral status of
other-than-human animals before deciding what moral conduct
is in regards to those animals (Hursthouse 2006, 136-54). She
decides in both cases that behavior should be guided first and
foremost by attention and reference to virtues and vices; how
one behaves should be grounded in the kind of person one aspires to be and driven less at the outset by determinations of
the moral status of the being/entity affected by one’s behavior.
The type of being/entity affected by one’s conduct or to
whom one’s conduct is directed soon becomes important, of
course. What it means to be a virtuous person in relation to a
rock is different from what it would mean to be a virtuous person in relation to a living being, for instance. But there is less
difference in actual behavior (guided by virtue) than one might
suppose. A virtuous person would be unlikely to kick a rock
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just because he or she can kick the rock because a virtuous person will be thoughtful at all times, in accordance with virtues
that align with taking the least disruptive or potentially harmful
action. Kicking a rock or throwing a computer out of a window
in frustration would not be the act of a virtuous person because
meaningless displacement of the rock or impulsive acting out
of frustration does not match up well with several virtues such
as patience and temperance in one’s actions. Therefore, even
if one imagines other-than-human animals to be no different
than rocks, those animals should not be subjected to the type
of suffering currently inflicted on them. That those animals are
not rocks, that they are sentient, means that additional virtues,
such as kindness, apply to situations involving them, but the
focus is still on acting in accordance with virtues. One’s first order priority is the application of virtues to one’s actions, rather
than basing one’s actions on an assessment of whether an otherthan-human animal is more like a rock or more like a human
animal. Ideally one would ask, “What would a [kind, courageous, honest, temperate] person do?” and not “What does the
moral status of this entity require of me?” In this way, virtue
ethics takes care of a serious problem Hursthouse identifies
with respect to moral status inquiries leaving unexamined the
question of how one is supposed to behave in relation to those
entities that are not considered to be inside the moral community (Hursthouse 1997).
Hursthouse does not use the example of law as it pertains to
other-than-human animals. But the approach she questions—
determining the status of such animals first, with moral obligation following from that status—is one of the most salient and
problematic features of animal law. Other-than-human animals
are legally the property of human animals, and what is appropriate conduct towards an other-than-human animal is almost
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entirely determined by that status (Francione 1995, 38-48). I
say “almost entirely” because all states in the United States
have enacted anticruelty statutes, which ostensibly prohibit human animals from inflicting severe suffering on an animal who
is not a human (Wagman, Waisman, and Frasch 2009, 90-137).
Other-than-human animals are not the property of human animals in the same way that, say, a table is property; inanimate
objects such as tables are not covered by anticruelty statutes.
Nevertheless, the rule that severe suffering and death can be
inflicted if doing so is considered necessary effectively eviscerates the prohibition on inflicting suffering. In fact, it is most
accurate to say that anticruelty statutes do nothing more than
prohibit completely gratuitously inflicted severe suffering; they
do not inhibit in the least, let alone prohibit, severe suffering
inflicted on other-than-human animals as a matter of standard
business practices in institutional or industrial settings (Ibrahim 2006; Francione 1995, 134-60). All institutionalized forms
of inflicted suffering, as, for example, in factory farms, animal research facilities, and pest control activities, are accepted
as “necessary.” Indeed, many of these activities are explicitly
exempted, thereby eliminating any doubt about how a judicial
evaluation of “necessity” would turn out. Thus, when it comes
to factory farming, animal research facilities, pest control, and
many other contexts in which other-than-human animals are
harmed and killed, such animals are the legal equivalent of inanimate objects such as tables: any type or amount of harm can
be inflicted, and the human animals who inflict that harm are
legally free of the label “cruel” (Francione 1995, 134-60).
One could debate whether anticruelty statutes are most usefully understood as situated within a deontological framework,
being categorical rules with many exceptions, or situated in a
utilitarian framework, requiring at the outset the balancing of
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human animals’ and other-than-human animals’ interests to determine how the legal rule should be structured and apply. And,
of course, one could also debate whether it is the role of law
to embed or encourage individual moral conduct as opposed
to the regulation of resources and maintenance of an orderly
society.1 However, my primary goal in this essay is to consider
how virtue ethical concepts, many as developed by Rosalind
Hursthouse, could enrich the discourse about animal law reform. I conclude that virtue ethical principles can be useful
when dealing with a narrow class of animal law reform situations in which various potential legal alternatives exist, the alternatives are based on different moral conceptions of the best
practice to be supported or required by the legal rule, and those
involved in the reform effort share sufficient values relevant to
the task at hand and respect for one another to work together to
propose or refine legal rules, policies, or guidelines for particular situations despite holding differing moral judgments about
the specifics of those rules, policies, or guidelines.

Features of a Virtue Ethical Approach
One of the goals of Hursthouse’s book On Virtue Ethics is
to examine how virtue ethics provides a (not unproblematic)
guide to action, as do deontological and utilitarian systems (in
not unproblematic ways). A person could decide not to pull
a cat’s tail because he has been told not to and is following
that rule (derived from deontological or utilitarian reasoning)
or because, as a person who values kindness, he wants to be
kind in all endeavors including his interactions with the cat.
With enough practice with the virtues, the virtuous person will
eventually not even consider pulling the cat’s tail, whereas the
person who simply follows rules may still be tempted and find
1 Some would say that even without intentionality, laws shape conceptions of
the “good person” (Stout 2011).
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reasons why pulling the cat’s tail on a particular occasion can
be made to fit with an exception to the rule. Under many, if
not most, circumstances involving other-than-human animals,
mere rule-compliance becomes a proxy for gauging whether an
individual is moral. Thus, an animal-based research scientist
working within an exemption in an anticruelty statute escapes
the label of “cruel,” no matter how unnecessary the research
and how much suffering other-than-human animal subjects endure because of it. If she measures her morality by reference to
legal compliance, she can engage in research that would shock
the moral sensibilities of observers without ever once doubting
the sufficiency of her moral judgment. Some may argue that
such indicates the inherent lack of sound moral judgment in the
law itself. But, even if one grants that is so, and even if laws, including their exceptions, are based on sound moral judgments,
mere legal compliance is at best a substitution of others’ moral
judgments for one’s own responsibility to ensure that one’s behavior is morally sound.
Virtue ethical conduct trains an individual in ever more virtuous behavior as he practices making decisions about what to
do based on virtues he seeks to entrain and vices he seeks to
avoid. By comparison, rule-following behavior may train the
individual primarily or only in rule-compliance, which could
include the (not particularly virtuous) ready adoption of exceptions to the rule so as to satisfy desires that cannot be resolved
without apparent violation of the rule. This is not to say that the
virtuous person never pulls a cat’s tail. A kind person would
pull a cat’s tail if it were the surest and safest way of rapidly
removing the cat from greater harm than the risk of harm to the
cat from pulling his tail. But the virtuous, kind person would
be exercising the virtue of kindness, rather than operational-
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izing an exception to a rule of “no cat tail pulling.” Kindness
required the particular act—in this case, pulling the cat’s tail.
This is also not to say that incorporation of virtue is exclusive to virtue ethical reasoning. For example, it could be that
the basis for a deontological rule to not pull the cat’s tail is
also based on a principle of kindness. In that case, the virtue
ethical rule not to pull the cat’s tail may differ from the deontological rule only in that the motivation of kindness is more
salient in the former than in the latter. However, there could be
other reasons for a “no cat tail pulling” rule that is situated in
a deontological framework. It is not always the case that there
is one possible basis for a deontological rule or that the basis
is clearly known. In such a case, one may be following a rule
simply because one has been taught to follow the rule and not
because one understands the basis for the rule. One is not being kind or becoming more kind if one does not know that the
reason for the rule against cat tail pulling is kindness, because
there could be other reasons for the rule. Once rules are codified through legal process, their relationship to whatever moral
rule once grounded them can become sufficiently attenuated
that use of exceptions and the pursuit of loopholes become the
predominant guide to action.
Being “virtuous” could come to include the behavior of “rulecompliance.” However, rule-compliance is a behavior and not
a virtue, such as kindness, fairness, compassion, integrity, and
courage. Moreover, simply behaving in a rule-compliant way
does not necessarily lead to ever more virtuous conduct. In order for the conduct to be virtuous and promote the development
of a virtuous character, one would need to know the basis in
virtue for each rule, virtuous reasons for exceptions, and when
to follow the rule or an exception in a virtuous way. One would
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have to desire and intend first and foremost to be and become
ever more virtuous. This commitment to deontological rules for
reasons of virtue would be an example of a hybrid virtue ethicsdeontological type of reasoning. One’s basic commitment to
and actual acting in accordance with virtues and avoiding vices
provides an ever-increasing ability to behave virtuously in relation to all situations, whether there are rules derived from other
normative theories associated with those situations or not.
A person who, when confronted with a decision she identifies as a moral question, wonders “what kind of person do I
want to be?” rather than “what rule am I to follow?” should
be able to develop a moral compass that can stand her in good
stead as she encounters decisions of different degrees of complexity and novelty. This is because she is constantly guiding
her behavior by reference to virtues and avoiding vices, learning as she goes along how to behave more virtuously, and enjoying such evidence as she obtains that she is becoming more
virtuous. She thereby trains her emotions as well as her behavior such that she can make increasingly better moral decisions.
It seems an ideal way to build a virtuous character. It also seems
to be a good perspective with which to engage in legal reform
with others who understand that the legal issues at stake contain morally charged aspects.
Unfortunately, it is not easy or simple to build a virtuous
character or to engage in legal reform when reformers disagree
about what a good moral outcome would be. A significant challenge for a virtue-oriented individual is that different virtues
may at times seem to require different actions, such as the occasional conflict between kindness and honesty to a friend. Those
conflicts cannot always be readily prioritized in order to provide
a clear course of action either on the individual level or when
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it comes to legal reform. Similarly, at times the expression of a
single virtue may arise in connected contexts such that there is
conflict or uncertainty about the most virtuous action one could
take, such as a situation in which an expression of kindness
to one person would result in an outcome that is not necessarily kind to another. How should one resolve such dilemmas?
Should one resolve such a dilemma based on such characteristics as the closeness of one’s relationship or assessments of the
apparent virtue of each of those who would be differentially affected by one’s actions? Should the dilemma be resolved based
on some other aspects of the situation? How can laws be based
on virtues when there are such priority problems? As I discuss
later, this type of problem constrains applicability of virtue ethics in law, but it does not prevent all such application.
Priority and application problems are not unique to virtue
ethical considerations, of course. They arise in deontological and utilitarian rule development and application contexts
as well. Moreover, such dilemmas are exacerbated when they
arise as to conduct involving other-than-human animals, if such
animals are given any moral consideration in human animals’
ethical decision-making at all.
As an example of priority and application challenges in the
virtue ethical context, imagine an egg producer who knows that
the suffering of egg-laying chickens is extremely severe (Vegan
Peace Home 2012; Davis 1996, 51-82; Singer 1990, 107-119).
He knows firsthand that, because the species of chickens used
for egg production is not the same as those used for meat production, males of the species are economically useless. Imagine
trays of recently hatched chicks on a conveyor belt taking those
chicks past various workers. The males, who are totally useless for egg production, are tossed into grinders or thrown into
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plastic bags or dumpsters where they suffocate from the weight
of those thrown in after them. Females continue down the conveyor belt where their beaks are seared or cut and their toes are
cut (with no analgesic or anesthetic), ending up in small wire
cages they rapidly outgrow. The cages have wire floors that
slant so that eggs will roll forward for ease of human collection,
meaning that a hen can never stand on a level surface. She has
no privacy, which hens seek out under normal circumstances.
There is no opportunity to dust bathe, and no opportunity to
spread her wings, let alone spread her wings in the sun. As ambient ammonia levels rise from all the hens’ waste that drops
through the wire caging, severe eye irritation and blindness are
common. Since it is difficult for workers to remove dead hens
from crowded cages, a living hen may well have to share the
cramped cage with dying and dead hens. When egg production
drops off she may be starved along with the others so that those
who survive the “forced molt” will have a few more cycles
of increased egg production. When she is no longer useful for
egg production, she can be killed, along with the others, in any
number of terrible but inexpensive ways.2
Suppose that the egg producer knows that chickens can experience pain and apprehension, including the male chicks, and
that kindness would dictate foregoing many, if not all of these
acts. Indeed, he has considered the possibility that he ought not
be in the egg production business at all, due to the suffering he
knows he is inflicting on thousands of chickens. Yet, he might
also genuinely believe that it is the only way he could make a
living for his family and that earning money for his family is
kind, even if it means harming chickens. Thus, the egg producer could consider himself to be a kind person even though
some of his acts are not kind.
2 Poultry are not covered by the federal Humane Methods of Slaughter Act
(U.S. Code, Title 7, §§1901-1907).
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This example left to the side those people who do not know
that chickens suffer. To them, it is not obvious that the virtue of
kindness even enters the picture; to them, it would be comparable to being kind to a rock. However, scientists have confirmed
that chickens experience pain (Nicol 2012), and, even if that
had not been definitively confirmed, a kind person, watching
a male chick trying desperately not to slip into a grinder, or
slowly suffocating under the mass of other chicks thrown on
top of him, or dehydrating and burning in the sun at the top of
a dumpster, would err on the side of compassion and not participate in the cruelty that appears to be unfolding (Bravebirds
2012). In other words, a kind person who doesn’t already know
about the suffering inherent in egg production would take steps
to learn whether an act in which he is engaged is unkind and
seek the path of kindness. Indeed, the pursuit of practical wisdom in exercising virtues (such as kindness, compassion) and
avoiding vices (such as cruelty, insensitivity) is an overarching
virtue in Hursthouse’s virtue ethical framework3 (Hursthouse
1999, 13, 59-62). Learning new information that informs that
process is itself virtuous and necessary for the exercise of other
virtues and avoidance of vices.
Pursuit of factual information alone will not solve the problem of priorities of virtues. In On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse
considers conflicting virtues and prioritizing virtues when she
writes about dilemmas that may fall into three different categories: resolvable, irresolvable, and tragic. Understanding these
categories is useful for the development of strategies for addressing priority and other application problems in virtue ethics
and in the application of virtue ethics to law. Those problems
3 Wisdom is an overarching virtue because it is a virtue about which it cannot
be said that a person has the virtue “to a fault.” One can never be too wise,
as one can be too honest or too frugal, for example. (Hursthouse 1999, 13,
59-62)
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are severe as to human animals’ interactions with other-thanhuman animals because of ingrained dismissive and disrespectful societal attitudes toward other-than-human animals and the
existence of laws that further those attitudes.
Resolvable dilemmas are dilemmas which can be resolved
if the virtuous person has the wisdom to apply virtues appropriately. Equally virtuous people would ultimately arrive at the
same resolution of a resolvable dilemma (Hursthouse 1999, 4262). This is a type of dilemma that may be addressable through
wise pursuit and integration of information into one’s thinking
about problematic situations. It is not kind to treat chickens as
the egg producer treats them, and a virtuous person would pursue information and courses of action that would result in his
not treating chickens that way. Once we reach a point at which
it is clear that treating chickens as they are treated in American agriculture is unkind to chickens, unnecessary for human
health, harmful in degrading water, air, and soil quality, and
leads to inefficient utilization of plant resources in ways that
aggravate prevalence of hunger, we have reached the resolution of the dilemma. It would seem at that point that the rule
prohibiting such treatment should, as a moral matter, be codified. That such codification has not happened is arguably due
primarily to political realities and consumer unwillingness to
change pleasure-seeking practices, rather than genuine uncertainty about moral grounding for such a rule (Ibrahim 2006;
Francione 2010). It is a sobering example of the limits of codification even if a moral dilemma is resolved.
By contrast, an irresolvable dilemma is one in which there
isn’t just one course of virtuous action that is preferable to another (Hursthouse 1999, 63-71). Stated differently, if two equally virtuous people were confronted with the same dilemma, one
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might choose one virtuous course of action, and the other might
choose another equally virtuous course of action. An example
might be the production of an amicus brief to support whales
in a legal case filed by Japanese whalers to stop Sea Shepherd
from thwarting their hunts. Suppose a virtuous philosopher
wishes the court to know about the scientific and philosophical
basis for appreciating the magnificence of whales and the desirability of protecting them from all human-inflicted harms. She
is advised by a virtuous and experienced attorney that the judge
responsible for the case will accept such a brief only if it is
framed in terms of the public’s (humans’) interest in protecting
whales and not directly for the sake of the whales themselves.
This requirement conflicts with the philosopher’s point of view
that whales should be protected regardless of humans’ interest
in them. It is also the point of view she thinks that the whales
would wish to be taken on their behalf. Her choice is whether to
behave virtuously in the sense of being forthright with the court
about what, based on the evidence about whales, she genuinely
believes (and how she believes whales’ would wish to be presented), or to behave virtuously in the sense of increasing the
likelihood that evidence about whales will be heard at all by the
court, albeit in a less whale-respecting way. Both express the
virtues of kindness and compassion.
Hursthouse cautions that, to the actor herself, there may appear to be only one virtuous way to proceed, and for that person that particular dilemma appears to be a resolvable one. If,
however, the actor herself recognizes that virtue could be understood to allow different responses to the same set of facts,
she will find herself confronting an irresolvable dilemma. Of
course, there can be much disagreement about whether two or
more courses of action are in fact equally virtuous and about
whether a truly virtuous person could not find a way to engage
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all applicable virtues equally in her action. But, the point here
is that there will be such situations in which equally virtuous
but different reactions to the same set of facts will be possible
and the virtuous actor will, herself, be aware of the dilemma. In
those cases, there is no single virtuous response to the dilemma,
leading some to criticize virtue ethics as failing to provide action guidance. This presumes that action guidance must result
in one and only one virtuous course of action. Letting go of
that presumption sufficiently to give virtue ethics a fair trial is,
perhaps, one of the greatest challenges a newcomer faces. It
is particularly difficult in a legal context, if one’s objective is
to find one and only one legal rule that can be derived from a
virtuous process of reasoning.
Finally, there are tragic dilemmas (Hursthouse 1999, 71-85).
In these situations the virtuous agent’s life will be marred by
whatever virtuous action she might take. Philosophers often
present railroad track (“trolley problem”) scenarios in which
either one person or several people will be killed depending
on the action or inaction taken by a person positioned so as to
affect whether the one or the several will be killed. In the end,
the person who acts or who fails to act will have the blood of
at least one person on her hands; no matter how virtuous the
reasoning process and the resultant act, her life will be forever
marred by the commission or the allowance of a death to occur.
A similar example is the tragic dilemma faced by feral cat
colony caretakers who discover an aggressive cat in the midst
of the colony. The cat attacks other cats to the point that they
may develop life-threatening abscesses, but there is no possibility of relocating the aggressive cat or the victim cats. Killing
an aggressive cat will undoubtedly save some unknown number of victim cats from deaths from abscesses or being chased
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into the path of cars. But killing the one to preserve the lives
of the others obviously involves taking a unique and individual
animal’s life. Either way, the colony manager will have blood
on her hands.
Whether the example of the aggressive feral cat is seen as a
“tragic dilemma” might appear to turn on how one thinks about
the value of cats and the killing of cats. If a person cares little
about the lives of the cats or the violence attendant to killing
them (or other other-than-human animals), that person might
understand the dilemma as salient but not tragic by Hursthouse’s terms. That may be because the actor either does not
value cats or, perhaps, does not think that veterinary-assisted
killing is violent and disrespectful to the cats and, therefore,
doesn’t believe her life would be marred by either course of action that would involve killing the one or the many. However,
the facts that other-than-human animals experience suffering
and value their lives means that killing the one or the many in
a situation similar to a trolley problem raises the same tragic
dilemma as in a trolley problem involving potential human victims.
We will return later to the feral cat situation and apply it in
a legal context, but, at this point, it is important that all categories of dilemmas defined in Hursthouse’s terms—resolvable,
irresolvable, and tragic—have a subjective, agent-centered
quality to the extent that the agent must take responsibility for
becoming ever more virtuous. To Hursthouse, it is the manner in which the actor reasons through the options by reference to furthering virtues and avoiding vices that enables us to
characterize an actor as a person of virtue or not. It is not by
absolute reference to the act itself and its consequences. For
example, she is careful to note that vegetarianism is not itself a
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virtue, even though vegetarianism, practiced for whatever reason, results in less suffering experienced by other-than-human
animals (Hursthouse 2006, 141-43). If one is a vegetarian exclusively for reasons of one’s own health or for reasons of disliking neighboring cattle ranchers, the individual’s vegetarianism does not necessarily indicate that the person is kind, and
her vegetarianism is not the exercise of the virtue of kindness
(although it may be the exercise of another virtue or virtues).
She makes no headway with entraining the virtue of kindness,
even if others might attribute kindness to her on the basis of her
vegetarianism.
Keeping all of the foregoing in mind, we can return to the
egg producer who knows that his actions cause chickens to suffer terribly but who nevertheless engages in those actions for
reasons of supporting his family. Would the egg producer consider the dilemma to be “resolvable,” “irresolvable,” or even
“tragic?” Would it matter? And, if he does perceive the situation as a dilemma, as a virtuous person would he not acquire
the wisdom necessary to find a different way of supporting his
family? Stated differently, is the egg producer a “kind” person
because he understands his acts to be kind to his family; must
he consider the chickens at all? Since chickens suffer and show
many signs of valuing their lives, it is simply not possible to
consider one kind if one does not take into account those characteristics of chickens when deciding how to act in relation to
chickens. And that is as true of consumers as of producers of
eggs and chickens.
Hursthouse does address the problem of a virtuous person
who, having premised a decision on a particular virtue, realizes
that another or the same virtue has been negatively impacted
(Hursthouse 1999, 44-48). She writes of this “remainder” as a
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cause for remorse, which, if recognized as such, provides some
support for the virtue that is under-represented in the ultimate
decision. However, stopping at that point—the experience of
remorse about the road not taken—is not virtuous if the actor
does not also continue in the quest for a way of eliminating the
conflict that results in harm to some being or entity. The egg
producer who is just sad about inflicting suffering on chickens, without searching for a way to accomplish the goals of
kindness to family and kindness to chickens—or, at least, not
participating in their suffering—is simply not a kind or virtuous
person.

Legal Applications
Taking into account the ease with which the meaning and application of virtues can be manipulated, virtue ethics does not
seem to provide a straightforward basis for a general anticruelty statute. Here I am distinguishing “general” from “specific”
anticruelty statutes. General anticruelty statutes state in general
terms that it is a criminal offense to mutilate, torment, torture,
or kill an animal without necessity to inflict such serious suffering or death. One can understand these laws as creating a
duty not to harm other-than-human animals, with recognized
exemptions and exceptions to the rule. Or, one can understand
them as creating a balancing requirement captured by the requirement that infliction of suffering be justified as “necessary.” The language of general anticruelty statutes supports
either understanding.
Jurisdictions also have specific anticruelty statutes, such as a
statute that prohibits cutting off the tails of dairy cows because
of the suffering the cows endure when their tails are cut off
(California Penal Code § 597n). Those are equally susceptible
of being understood as requiring balancing as to each applica-
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tion of the law or as establishing duties for which exceptions
are allowed. Nevertheless, it is in this context of more specific codification that virtue ethics may in some cases provide a
procedural pathway to the enactment of virtue-oriented legal
provisions. I will explore a specific example of that process
shortly. At this point, however, I note only that it is unlikely that
a general anticruelty statute written from an explicitly virtue
ethical approach would look any different or be any different in
operation than the current anticruelty statutes apparently premised on deontological or utilitarian grounds. For instance, an
example of an apparently virtue-ethically-based law (but not a
criminal anticruelty statute) is California’s Civil Code section
1834, which requires “depositaries of living animals,” such as
shelters and people who find apparently lost other-than-human
animals, to treat those animals “kindly.” The virtue of kindness
is explicitly invoked. However, there is no specified content of
what it means to treat an other-than-human animal “kindly,”
and, sadly, most animals held by animal shelters in California
actually are not treated kindly despite the law requiring kind
treatment. As in the case of this California Civil Code section,
the level of statutory generality of general anticruelty statutes,
too, provides too little guidance regardless of the moral philosophical platform on which it was enacted. It does not anticipate or address how priority or application problems could be
resolved. If we all shared an understanding of what such “kindness” would entail in general terms, we would still have difficulty with application in specific contexts.
Another problem for codification of a virtue ethical standard
is that codification freezes a process that must be dynamic until
there is no remainder or apparent irresolvability. In fact, Hursthouse explicitly cautions against the impulse to codify rules
premised on outcomes resulting from the exercise of virtues
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(Hursthouse 1999, 39-42, 56-59). Even if the unique intersection of circumstances and virtues could be captured in a rule, to
be virtuous, one must seek to become ever more virtuous and
not settle for the resolution of dilemmas that leave remainders
and remorse. And codifying only one way of behaving when in
fact there are several virtuous ways of behaving would not be
virtuous, either. Codification would be appropriate only when
apparent irresolvability has been resolved or accepted within
the structure of the statute or when virtuous behavioral outcomes consistently result in no remainder. We as a society are a
long way from that as concerns other-than-human animals and
general anticruelty statutes.
If not in the context of general anticruelty laws, how could
virtue ethical rules be used in the development of specific laws,
which are, after all, written at some level of generality in order to be codified? According to Hursthouse, being a virtuous
person involves commitment to developing in oneself an engrained, virtuous approach to living in the world. The question
one asks of oneself is “what kind of person do I want to be?”
Moreover, the truly virtuous person enjoys living virtuously
and does not begrudge “having” to be virtuous. To get to that
point, a person has to exercise virtues repeatedly until they are
second nature, without each time asking oneself whether one
“must” act in accordance with particular virtues or if the damage to one’s character will be too great if one doesn’t.Can law
create the circumstances under which a person is required (or
given enough choice) to behave virtuously in specific, particularized circumstances?
We think of laws as creating duties and rights, often but not
always on a utilitarian basis. Is there room for the kind of approach Hursthouse envisions, an approach whose primary goal
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is not the creation of duties and rights? Although it is difficult
to imagine codification of an effective law that requires kindness or compassion or integrity, there may be a few types of legal proceedings in which virtue ethical principles supply some
guidance. In the remainder of this essay, I return to my earlier
example of feral cat colony management to explore the possibility of such an approach in the context of disputes about
feral cat colony regulation. Such disputes are numerous in the
United States (as well as in other countries), and various legal approaches for dealing with feral cat colonies are emerging
such that they can provide a means for considering possible
virtue ethical-legal approaches.

A Virtue Ethical Approach to Feral Cat Colony
Regulation
Because virtue ethical concepts can be understood and
applied only in finer grained, particularized contexts, it is important to have some sense of who feral cats are. The quality
of “feral-ness” pertains to the degree of contact and control a
cat will readily accept from humans. Cats exhibit temperaments that range from completely docile and trusting to totally
human-avoidant. But that spectrum does not convey an accurate picture. Many indoor cats behave at the docile end of the
spectrum when they are with their human families but behave
at the opposite end of the spectrum when they are around unfamiliar humans or in frightening or novel situations such as animal shelters or veterinary clinics. Some indoor cats who have
received inadequate care or have been victimized by outright
abuse may have behavioral triggers even though they are usually docile.
Outdoor cats are equally difficult to categorize. Free-roaming human-appreciating cats, who may spend chunks of time in-
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doors with human families, may look the same as free-roaming
completely human-avoidant cats. Moreover, completely tame
cats can “go feral,” and the offspring of completely feral cats
can be tamed if they receive socialization by humans before
they reach the age of 3 months. Thus, the categories of feral
and non-feral cats are fairly fluid. Accordingly, beginning with
an inquiry as to the moral status of feral cats prior to developing normative expectations of conduct towards feral cats would
be difficult unless one retreated to classification based on their
status as other-than-human animals.
That fluidity also confers more protection to cats than if
the categories of feral and non-feral cats were distinct, with
feral cats being treated as wild animals easily characterized
as “pests,” such as raccoons and squirrels, for example. Ambiguity or fluidity in categorizing cats results in a variety of
protective responses to feral cats when there are proposals to
use lethal methods to reduce outdoor cat populations. For instance, some people think of all cats as similarly dependent on
the kindness of people and deserving of protection; some worry
only about the possibility of mistaking a pet cat for a feral cat;
some actually respect feral cats for their fiercely independent
characteristics. Thus, for various reasons, cats potentially subject to lethal population reduction have many vocal defenders
when they are in danger.
Outdoor cats have vociferous detractors as well. When outdoor cat population sizes grow there are calls to trap and kill the
cats who are blamed for predation on birds or use of flowerbeds
as litter boxes, for example. Defenders argue that cats should
not pay with their lives for someone’s heartless abandonment
and that trap-neuter-return programs are more humane and
more effective over time. Both sides appeal to local legislators
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for codification of their approach, and legislators increasingly
respond with some kind of legislative action, if only to dial
down the volume of the controversy.
Some jurisdictions opt for kill-oriented approaches. In 2002,
ordinances in Akron, Ohio, allowed for the trapping and immediate killing of “fractious” cats (City of Akron 2002). Although
those statutes have been revised, the idea of killing or allowing
the hunting of feral cats emerges with some frequency. Wisconsin (Schabner 2005), New Jersey (Singer 2010), and Utah (Adams 2011) have all considered allowing hunting of feral cats.
Nevertheless, there are also municipalities that reject trapkill methods of population control if feral cat colony caretakers agree to follow rules about colony management so as to
minimize perceived nuisance or health risks. Colony caretakers
and the heads of nonprofits dedicated to feral cat protection are
sometimes called to help draft legislation that would allow feral
cat colonies to exist as long as certain conditions are met. The
cities of Glendale and Beverly Hills in California are two examples. Both cities enacted ordinances after participation in the
process by feral cat colony caretakers and nonprofits dedicated
to the protection of stray cats (City of Glendale 2004; City of
Beverly Hills 2009). Yet the process of developing rules is arduous and time-consuming because feral cat colony caretakers have very different approaches to management and, having
struggled with the moral and ethical dimensions of their decisions, often feel that they have an ethical obligation to cats to
press for codification of their way of doing things.
It is in this context that a virtue ethical approach might be
useful both in terms of how to ethically allow an outcome that
does not wholly reflect one’s own sincere moral choices and as
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to what type of ordinance would be a logical outcome of the
process. The participants in this context share an interest in protecting feral cats and are uncertain only about the specifics of
colony management to be codified in a regulatory scheme. The
example that follows suggests that, as to situations in which important relevant facts are unknowable, legal rules should not be
finally codified until those facts become knowable. This means
that such rules should have built-in mechanisms for revisiting
particular aspects of a rule, and there should be concerted effort on the part of participants to further educate themselves or,
as Rosalind Hursthouse might recommend, pursue the practical wisdom necessary to revisit particular aspects in a virtuous
way.
Suppose, as has happened in several localities already, that
a legislative body, such as a city council or county board of
supervisors, calls on feral cat colony caretakers and the heads
of organizations dedicated to the protection and defense of feral cats to participate in a series of meetings for the purpose of
designing an appropriate set of conditions by which feral cat
colonies could be maintained without causing a nuisance. Participants are likely to agree without dispute that all cats must
be spayed or neutered so as to prevent population growth.4 Not
only is it through uncontrolled reproduction that cats become a
nuisance to their human neighbors, spaying and neutering cats
apparently confers health advantages to the individual cats.5
This is not to say that there are no risks to individuals as a
4 The description of feral cat caretakers’ approaches in this section is based
on many interviews with feral cat caretakers in the greater Los Angeles area
and my reading of the literature that pertains to feral cats and managed colonies.
5 Reported advantages to spayed females include less physiological stress
associated with repeated pregnancies, births, and nursing in circumstances
of limited access to food, with some data suggesting that there is a lower
incidence of breast cancer in spayed cats. Neutered males reportedly roam
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result of surgical intervention in their reproductive capacities
or that interference with individuals’ reproductive capacities is
morally unproblematic. However, there is currently no less invasive or drastic a way of limiting feral cat population growth.
There may be considerable disagreement about whether the
spay requirement should also apply to pregnant females, since
that would involve abortion, but discussion of spay-neuter requirements usually begins on a platform of general agreement
due to a recognition that it is the only currently feasible way
of reducing the suffering attendant to uncontrolled population
growth. By comparison, discussion of other possible requirements is not likely even to start from a position of agreement.
I will work with just one example here because my goal is not
to actually develop feral cat guidelines; my objective is to illustrate features of virtue ethical reasoning in a particular type of
legal setting. In order to maintain focus on that objective rather
than the specific content of the example, I have chosen an example about which I would expect the reader not to have an immediate reaction. It is the issue of whether to require the testing
of feral cats for Feline Immunodeficiency Virus (FIV) and to
require that the cat be killed if he or she tests positive. People
who are generally ethical and who care very much about feral
cats differ as to what to do about FIV infection and the ethical
obligations of a feral cat caretaker as to FIV-infected members
of their feral cat colonies.
FIV infection is similar to human HIV infection in that infection causes the individual to become more susceptible to other
infections and illnesses. Individuals can lead long and healthy
lives if they receive prompt veterinary care for illnesses, high
quality food, and other incidents of a healthy lifestyle. Unfortunately, not many feral cats have access to regular veterinary
and fight less than unneutered males, which reduces their risks of contracting
certain illnesses, abscesses, and other infections.
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care, and most live outdoors in less than ideal circumstances for
the prevention of secondary effects from FIV infection. Moreover, there are individual FIV-infected cats who, like some human individuals with HIV infection, suffer such severe wasting and vulnerability to illness that their deaths can be fairly
attributed to the infection itself. Those individuals may suffer
considerably before their deaths.
FIV is transmitted between cats during mating or by way of
deep bites through which the virus carried by one cat’s saliva
can enter the blood stream of the other cat. It can also be transmitted from mothers to their unborn kittens. It is not transmitted when one cat eats or drinks from the same bowl as an FIVinfected cat. Although the question is very difficult to study
scientifically, the percentage of feral cats with FIV is thought to
be very low.6 However, there can be colonies with high rates of
FIV infection, and FIV could spread through a colony if an infected individual fights frequently with other cats in the colony.
There is currently no cure for FIV infection, despite the reported development of some drugs useful in treating the condition.7 Also, there are very few sanctuary options for FIV-infected cats. Also relevant is the fact that cats who have been
6 It is actually difficult to get a good assessment of FIV prevalence because
it is difficult to study feral cat populations. Moreover, people who do study
feral cat populations are usually not neutral; they are usually invested somehow in promoting either the killing or preservation of feral cats. However, a
localized study conducted in 2010 in western Canada produced the following
results: among 1,205 cats, 5.5% tested positive for FIV infection. (Ravi et al.
2010, 271).
7 T-Cyte Therapeutics claims to have developed a USDA-approved drug for
the treatment of FIV infection (http://tcyte.com/?gclid=CNnwpctC3rMCFS
FyQgodnwkA3Q). However, it is not billed as cure. Also, it is not currently
practical to inject feral cats with any type of medicine except when the cat is
already sedated (as for spay/neuter), and, therefore, it would not be possible
to follow a treatment protocol involving more than one injection.
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vaccinated against FIV will sometimes test positive for the
antibodies in a subsequent FIV test. Since some feral cats are
abandoned cats who have “gone feral,” there is the possibility
that a cat will test positive only because of previous vaccination.
Feral cat colony caretakers sort and weigh all of this information differently. A colony caretaker might decide to kill an
FIV-positive cat who is not yet suffering actively from FIV
rather than return her to the colony. Her conscientious and compassionate assessment of the benefits and risks from the cat’s
and other cats’ perspectives may well be based on actual experience dealing with cats whose FIV infection has developed
in such a way that the cats appeared to have suffered horribly
before and as they died. Having been trapped once, many cats
will not go near a trap again, and a colony caretaker may be
helpless to relieve such a cat’s final suffering. Indeed, some
cats disappear when they become debilitated, presumably having found a protected place to die. The caretaker might also
be calculating risk of other cats’ exposure, with the knowledge
that veterinarians cannot tell her which FIV-positive cats are
likely to develop a full-blown, debilitating case. Taking all of
these factors together and making a decision based on compassion for the individual cat, concern for other members of the
community, and respect for life, the colony caretaker who kills
can be said to have virtuously resolved the dilemma of what
to do about an FIV-positive feral cat in her colony as current
information and options now stand.
Another equally virtuous feral cat colony caretaker might
understand the same virtues—compassion, regard for others,
and respect for life—as requiring her to return the cat to the
colony. She may consider the risks of FIV progression and
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transmission too low and life too precious for her to take the
cat’s life. Such a person is actually better off not testing at all,
and, in fact, her understanding of her ethical obligations to the
cat and the colony might cause her justifiably and virtuously to
resist a legal requirement that feral cat colony caretakers FIV
test all cats trapped for spay/neuter. After all, getting a definitive FIV test can be expensive and saps funds caretakers could
spend on cat food and spay/neuter surgeries.
It would appear that this is what Rosalind Hursthouse would
identify as an irresolvable dilemma. At this state of scientific
knowledge about the illness and without alternatives such as
FIV cat sanctuaries, equally virtuous feral cat caretakers could
reach equally virtuous but completely different conclusions
about moral conduct in the case of a feral cat who tests positive
for FIV. Yet this is a situation in which only one way of handling
the situation would be embedded in the ordinance; either there
would be a requirement of testing and killing or there would not
be, with the outcome under the latter circumstance that some
feral cat colony caretakers would not be testing at all or would
be knowingly returning an FIV-positive cat to their colonies.8
As unethical as that seems to the caretaker who would test and
kill if the FIV test result is positive, it makes sense to leave the
8 Feline leukemia spreads more easily than FIV infection because it can be
transmitted by shared water and food bowls. Feline leukemia also more certainly results in death directly attributable to leukemia. For those reasons,
some caretakers test for leukemia and will kill in the context of a positive test
result, if they have no hospice options. Currently, many veterinarians offer a
combination feline leukemia and FIV test. If the FIV test comes back positive, a more definitive but expensive test can be run. There are caretakers who
will not kill in the presence of a negative leukemia test result even if there is
a positive FIV result, and they will not request the more expensive definitive
FIV test because they would not kill strictly for the reason of FIV-positive
test results in any case. These circumstances can result in some apparently
FIV-positive cats being returned to colonies.
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law open on this point and not to require one course of action or
another. That is because the reason for the irresolvability of the
dilemma has to do with factually quite volatile factors. Information about FIV infection, the development of FIV positive
cat sanctuaries, and possible cures for FIV infection could all
emerge after the initial legal regime has been put in place. Similarly virtuous feral cat caretakers could take similarly morally
defensible but completely different actions with dramatically
different effects on cats.
Suppose that the legal regime is put in place without specification of obligations as to FIV testing. After that regime is enacted, veterinary medical science determines that FIV infection
can be managed or its transmission prevented in ways that are
financially affordable and easy to accomplish even as to feral
cats whom caretakers cannot touch at all. The first caretaker—
the caretaker who tests and kills if a cat tests positive for FIV—
should be willing to adjust her policies accordingly, and the
existing law not requiring testing/killing would facilitate that
adjustment. A virtuous person might delay making the change
until she is convinced by more studies than it would take to
convince another caretaker, but ultimately a virtuous caretaker
will remain open to new reliable information that is relevant to
her ways of doing things. Indeed, a virtuous caretaker would
seek out such information in order always to be making decisions with as much information as possible. The one thing
she cannot do as a virtuous caretaker is decide as a permanent
matter how she is going to handle a life and death matter for a
cat and thus fail to continually look for relevant information,
be it veterinary medical information or information about FIVpositive cat sanctuaries. Being virtuous must include remaining
flexible enough to reshape one’s decisions.
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Similarly, the second caretaker—the caretaker who doesn’t
test at all or who doesn’t test and kill—must remain open to
the possibility that new information could result in a different
calculation of risk and ethical obligations flowing from that
risk. It might take a lot of change in relevant data before such
a caretaker would shift from life-preserving to life-taking because, after all, taking another’s life is serious moral business,
even if a feral cat could tell us that she would choose death
under the circumstance of a positive FIV test result. What the
caretaker cannot do and remain virtuous in her management of
the colony is blind herself to new relevant information or fail
to seek out relevant information. To use Rosalind Hursthouse’s
terminology, virtuous caretakers should resist embedding specific legal provisions, even if those provisions would comport
with their genuine beliefs about virtuous conduct, as long as
a resolvable dilemma has not yet been resolved or as long as
an irresolvable dilemma is irresolvable (there is more than one
equally virtuous approach). Those aspects of the law should
remain open until enough information becomes available to
have some measure of comfort that the dilemma is resolved or
resolvable. Of course, it is not always easy to identify which dilemmas fall into these categories and, therefore, require leaving
those matters open for the time being. Because of commitments
to their own virtuous resolutions of dilemmas, caretakers could
fail to see a dilemma as irresolvable or as not yet resolved from
another virtuous person’s point of view. Lack of confidence that
others are equally virtuous can make one skeptical that others
who have resolved the dilemma differently have resolved the
dilemma in a virtuous way.
In the example I have considered, the feral cat caretakers
would most likely agree that requiring spay/neuter would be
important in any regulation for the establishment or legal rec-
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ognition of a feral cat colony, even though there are some moral
and ethical issues associated with forever altering the reproductive capacity of an animal and with spaying pregnant cats.
The dilemma of whether to spay/neuter feral cats is resolvable,
albeit with the “remainder” of regret for some adverse consequences of the resolution. It is possible to argue that utilitarianism plays an important role in virtuously responding to a particular dilemma, but Rosalind Hursthouse does not contend that
hybrid utilitarian-virtue ethical or hybrid deontological-virtue
ethical outcomes are inferior to virtue ethical applications. She
contends only that virtue ethics, too, has a valid and valuable
role to play in providing guidance in the resolution of questions
about how we ought to behave in particular situations.
As the example of FIV testing illustrates, several other aspects of feral cat colony management might well be left open
either with the possibility of revisiting the ordinance as part of
a sunset provision or as part of an explicit procedural mechanism by which future amendments are considered. If a law is
scheduled to “sunset” (expire) on a particular date, there will
be a date certain at which the law will be reviewed in light
of currently available information and alternatives. Although
it might be more difficult or expensive than a sunset provision,
it would be more helpful if the law instead contained a mechanism for regularly updating associated regulations or rules as,
for instance, the establishment of a committee charged with
regular review of information and perspectives relevant to feral
cat colony maintenance. Through either mechanism, over time,
apparent gaps in substantive laws would be filled as once irresolvable dilemmas are resolved or as true irresolvability is
recognized and the law is left open enough for different virtuous avenues to be taken.
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It is important to clarify that “leaving a law open” on a particular point, such as not requiring FIV testing in a feral cat
colony management ordinance, is not the same thing as creating an “ambiguous” law. A law that does not speak to a particular activity, such as FIV testing, may be quite clear and nonambiguous as to requirements actually established by the law.
Indeed, all laws need to be sufficiently clear that those affected
by them can know what compliance entails. “Ambiguity” or
“vagueness” as a standard argument to undermine, invalidate,
or repeal laws in all sorts of different legal contexts is not absent in the animal law context. State anticruelty statutes have
been challenged as unconstitutionally vague as to which otherthan-human animals are covered and which acts, prohibited.
More recently, an unsuccessful lawsuit filed by an egg farmer
in California claimed that a law ending intensive confinement
caging systems in egg production in California and codified in
California’s Health and Safety Code sections 25990-25994 is
unconstitutionally vague because it does not include sufficient
guidance for farmers to enable them to avoid criminal punishment and fines (Cramer v. Brown 2012). Not including a requirement, such as not requiring FIV testing, does not subject a
colony caretaker to risk of punishment for violating an ambiguous law.

Conclusion
Bringing people together to participate in decisions, be they
about refinement of substantive rules or dispute resolution
about particular conflicts, does not ensure that those people
will behave virtuously. People who have been taught that they
are virtuous if they follow rules, even without understanding
the foundation of those rules in virtue, or if they successfully
exploit loopholes in laws, may not readily adopt a different
conception of virtue that requires ongoing practice in the de-
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velopment of practical wisdom in applying virtues within the
structure of a law left open for that purpose as to some aspects.
It does not appear that we have a culture of virtue in that sense
or, if there is a culture of virtue, that the virtues most highly
prized are ones that lead to compassionate outcomes for other-than-human animals. Indeed, humans arguably display the
most creativity and ingenuity when justifying decisions that are
not virtuous and in blinding themselves to their flaws. Moreover, it does not seem that legal process is a good place to instill
an approach to living that may be best embedded through other
avenues in our society. For that reason, legal rules premised
directly on virtues, such as “owners of living animals shall treat
them kindly,” have little utility in the American legal system.
The level of generality at which they are enacted provides insufficient guidance to those who would be potentially liable.
It seems that a virtue ethical approach in animal law is most
likely to be productive, if at all, in situations like the example of
substantive rule refinement by participants who share sufficient
values and interests to proceed in good faith. People whose
moral commitments vary greatly from one another would have
difficulty cooperating productively in the creation of legal rules
premised primarily on the operation of virtue ethical theory.
However, it does seem that a virtue ethical approach could be
possible in the development of substantive legal rules through
processes that require relatively virtuous participation by those
who understand virtues and virtuous conduct in similar ways
in the specific contexts at issue. As the feral cat example illustrates, participants in the process may start with strong moral
attachment to particular regulatory requirements. But, if it can
be shown that there is some informational uncertainty associated with their position and that there are morally justifiable
reasons to leave an apparent gap in the law, they should be
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willing to leave substantive rules open to future development
as new information comes available, thereby facilitating more
rapid resolution of issues to put in place laws that are at least
somewhat kinder than existing laws. Through the inclusion of
sunset provisions or automatic review provisions, more provisions can be adopted and existing provisions can be revised
when more information is available to resolve dilemmas once
understood as irresolvable.
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